This research examines and compares the performances in terms of systemic risk ranking for three different systemic risk metrics based on daily frequency publicly available data, specifically: Marginal Expected Shortfall (ES), Component Expected Shortfall (CES) and Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR). We compute ΔCoVaR, MES and CES by utilizing EVT principles for modelling marginal distributions and Student's t copula for describing the dependence structure between every bank and the banking system. Our objective is to attest whether different systemic risk metrics detect the same banks as systemically dangerous institutions with refer to a sample of European banks over the time span 2004-2015. For each bank in the sample we also calculate three traditional market risk measures, like Market VaR, Sharpe's beta and the correlation between every bank and the banking system (European STOXX 600 Banks Index). Another aim is to explore the existence of a link among systemic risk measures and traditional risk metrics. In addition, the classification results obtained by the different risk metrics are compared with the ranking in terms of systemic riskiness (for European banks) calculated by Financial Stability Board (2015) using end-2014 data and collected in its list of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). With refer to the entire sample period, we find a good coherence of ranking results among the three different systemic risk metrics, in particular between CES and ΔCoVaR. Moreover, we find for MES and ΔCoVaR a strong linkage with beta and correlation metrics respectively. Finally, CES metric shows the highest level of concordance with the list of G-SIBs by FSB with refer to European banks.
analytical explanation of the systemic risk metrics: MES, CES and ΔCoVaR. Section 4 explains the advanced methodologies implemented for computing the three different systemic risk metrics and describes the financial data set utilized for empirical analysis. Section 5 describes and comments in detail the main empirical results. In particular, these outcomes refer to systemic risk rankings for European banks in the sample based on different systemic risk metrics and different traditional risk measures (alternatively). Section 6 summarizes the most interesting findings of this research and concludes.
A Brief Review of Systemic Risk Metrics
MES is the Marginal Expected Shortfall metric introduced by Acharya et al. (2017) ; it represents the marginal contribution of an institution to systemic risk as measured by the Expected Shortfall (ES s ) of the system. MES is computed as the first derivative of the financial system risk (measured by its Expected Shortfall, ES s ) with respect to an institution's position (defined as the weight of institution's market capitalization in the market capitalization of the whole financial system).
MES reflects the sensitivity of the financial system tail risk to a unit change in an institution's position, namely to its relative size. In other words, MES measures the increase in the tail risk of the system induced by a marginal increase in the weight of the single institution in the system.
Originally proposed by Acharya et al. (2017) , MES was extended to a conditional version by Brownlees and Engle (2012) . By definition, the ES at the α% level is the expected return in the worst α% (from 1% to 5% typically) of the cases, but it can be extended to the general case in which the returns exceed a given threshold C.
In conclusion, MES i represents the marginal contribution of the single institution i to the tail loss of the whole financial system. The basic idea is that the institutions with the highest MES values contribute the most to market drops; thus, these institutions appear as the greatest drivers of systemic risk.
However, the main drawback of MES is that a small and unlevered institution can appear as more dangerous for the financial system than a big and levered one (Banulescu & Dumitrescu, 2013 ).
In addition, Benoit et al. (2013) find a strong positive relationship between MES and institution beta for a sample of top financial US institutions over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . According to Benoit et al. (2013) , this result implies that systemic risk ranking of financial institutions based on MES may reflect ranking obtained by ordering institutions on the traditional systematic (or market) risk measure of Sharpe's beta.
For overcoming this disadvantage, Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2017) extend the MES metric for taking into account nominal measures such as the liabilities and the leverage of the institution and propose the SRISK metric.
SRISK corresponds to the expected capital shortfall of the financial institution conditional to a crisis affecting the whole financial system. Following this metric, the institutions with the largest capital shortfall are considered the greatest contributors to crisis of financial system and, consequently, the most systemically dangerous institutions.
On the other hand, these nominal indicators (liabilities and leverage) are subject to availability problems, especially at a high (daily) frequency.
Because of all these problems, Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2013) suggest a new and simple alternative method to identify systemically important institutions, such as a component approach. Precisely, the authors propose a new systemic risk measure called Component Expected Shortfall (CES) for quantifying the contribution of each single institution to the overall risk, given that the financial system tail risk is measured by ES s .
According to the definition of Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2013) , CES measures the absolute contribution of an institution to the risk of the whole financial system (as opposed to the marginal contribution). It is obtained by calibrating the first derivative of the ES (for the system) using weights defined for each financial institution. Therefore the systemic riskiness of every financial institutions at a given date t is assessed by measuring each institution's contribution to the financial system's expected loss measured by ES. The larger the contribution, the more systemically important the institution.
CES metric depends both on the firm's size, given by its market capitalization relative to that of the entire financial system, and on the expected loss of the institution when the whole system is in a stress scenario. This new systemic risk measure allow us to select the riskiest financial firms on the market by directly ranking the institutions according to their riskiness.
In addition, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011; 2016) propose a co-risk metric, likely the CoVaR. This metric lets us to incorporate the dependence structure between every bank and the system in the systemic risk evaluation.
The authors expressed CoVaR as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the system conditional to the event of extreme losses for a single bank. The prefix -Co‖ of CoVaR means conditional, contagion or co-movement trying to take into account spillover risks among banks. Consequently, the quantitative framework of CoVaR is based on the conditional distribution of a random variable, X s,t , representing the (loss of) whole system, s, given the distress of a single bank, i, represented by a random variable X i,t .
By using this risk metric, it is possible to assess the marginal contribution of every institution to systemic risk, that is Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR). ΔCoVaR is the difference (Δ) between the CoVaR of the system conditional to the distress of that institution and its CoVaR conditional to the -normal‖ state of the same institution.
In other words, ΔCoVaR measures the contribution of every bank to the instability of the whole system. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011; 2016) underline as ΔCoVaR is not equivalent to VaR; in particular they report a weak relationship between the market tail risk of an institution measured in isolation by its VaR, and the ΔCoVaR of the same institution.
Also Benoit et al. (2013) find a weak linkage between the market VaR of each institution and its contribution to systemic risk, measured by its ΔCoVaR. In particular, their empirical studies on US financial sector over the period 2000-2010 confirm as systemic risk ranking of US financial institutions based on ΔCoVaR does not mirror ranking obtained by ordering institutions on market VaR.
Analytical Definition of Systemic Risk Measures

CoVaR and ΔCoVaR
Consider a random variable , representing the returns of a generic financial institution i at time t (i=1,…, N; t=1,…, T). The VaR of , at the probability level ∈ (0,1) is defined as in equation (1):
In equation (1) , −1 is the generalized inverse distribution function of the return distribution , . We can also represent equation (1) in the following way: Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011; 2016) defined CoVaR as in the following equation:
Equation (3) denotes the β-quantile of system returns, , conditional to , = , . Formally, , , is represented as the β-quantile of the conditional distribution in equation (3) where s≠ . The probability levels α and β can be fixed by the regulatory authorities. Usually these probability levels are fixed to 1% or 5%. Currently many works adopt a common probability value for α and β. In our study, a confidence level of 1% for α and β is assumed. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011; 2016) defined the contribution of each bank i to systemic risk using ΔCoVaR metric. Precisely:
MES and CES
We consider a financial system composed of the banks in the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index. X st represents the random variable of the daily log returns of the European banking sector, s, on day t (where t= 1, …, T and i= 1,…, N) using the following equation:
In equation (5) X it is the daily log return of the i-th bank in the Banking Index and w it is its weight.
MES i is the marginal contribution of an institution to systemic risk, as measured by the Expected Shortfall (ES) of the system. By definition, ES at the α% level is the expected return in the worst α% of the cases, but it can be extended to the general case in which the returns exceed a given threshold C.
In our study, C is equal to the Value-at-Risk of the random variable X st at the probability level of 1% over a daily holding period. In this study the crisis event is defined as the situation in which financial system's distress exceeds the VaR(1% MES is calibrated by means of individual weights of each bank in order to obtain CES.
The conditional ES of the system is defined analytically as in equation (6):
Then, the MES corresponds to the partial derivative of the system ES with respect to the weight of institution i in the financial system. Analytically:
MES measures the increase in the risk of the system, measured by ES, induced by the marginal contribution of the institution i to the risk of the financial system. The higher the institution's MES, the higher the individual contribution of the firm to the risk of financial system instability.
CES measures the absolute contribution of an institution to the risk of the whole financial system (as opposed to the marginal contribution). It is achieved by calibrating the first derivative of the ES (for the system) using weights defined for every bank as in equation (8):
In addition, ( ) = −1 ( | < ) measures the total contribution of component i to the overall ES, where −1 ( | < ) corresponds to the MES it (C).
Furthermore, the percentage version of the Component Expected Shortfall (CES%) can be introduced. CES% it (C) measures the proportion of systemic risk at time t due to institution i. It is calculated as the component loss normalized by the financial system loss.
Precisely, CES% it (C) risk measure can be immediately computed once the weights w it are defined and the conditional expectation −1 ( | < ) is calculated. While the weights are easily obtained using market capitalization data for all the institutions in the sample, the expected value of institution returns conditional on the market being in stress requires a more complex analysis. For this reason, we use the fact that −1 ( | < ) corresponds to the MES.
By equation (7) the systemic riskiness of financial institutions at a given date t can be assessed by measuring each institution contribution to the financial system expected loss measured by ES. The larger the contribution, the more systemically important the institution.
The systemic risk measure of CES is defined as a natural extension of Component Value-at-Risk (Jorion, 2007) to the Expected Shortfall. In portfolio risk management literature we find both marginal and component risk measures. While marginal VaR measures the effect of one unit change in the position of a given component on portfolio risk (measured by portfolio VaR), the component VaR shows how the portfolio VaR would change if the component was removed from portfolio.
In the same way, both type of measures can be utilized to evaluate the systemic risk by measuring the impact of an institution on the financial system risk (measured by system ES). On the other hand, the marginal measure of MES does not take into account the firm size (measured by its relative market capitalization). This characteristic of MES can produce an improper ranking of the institutions in which small and negligible firms appear as SIFI. Differently, the component measure of CES takes explicitly into account the size of the institutions in the systemic risk measurement by following the logic of the too-big-to-fail (Banulescu & Dumitrescu, 2013) .
Methodology
We model the equity returns of the banks in the sample taking into account for the property of volatility clustering. In particular, an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) approach is used for modelling the returns of banking sector s and the generic bank i at time t. Analytically:
, 2 = 0 + 1 ( , −1 − , −1 ) 2 + 2 , −1 2 with 0 , 1 , 2 >0, 1 + 2 < 1 and | | < 1, j=i,s. The distribution of the residuals Z j,t is modelled as a stochastic process with zero mean, variance equal to one and c.d.f.
, .
In order to determine the CoVaR of equity returns, we can compute the CoVaR of the residuals , , and then rescale it as follows: We assume that the marginal distributions of the standardized log-returns Z i,t for financial institutions are the following (Note 2):
where N(x;µ,σ) is the Gaussian c.d.f., µ is the mean of the random variable X and σ is the standard deviation of the random variable X.
We have selected the threshold R i u as the highest x such that the normal c.d.f.
is the number of historical returns exceeding x. The threshold L i u has been selected as the lowest x such that
T is the number of returns exceeding x. In this way the monotonicity property of the c.d.f. (11) is preserved.
The copula of the bivariate Student's t distribution is the Student's t copula. Let X be a vector with a two-variate Student's t distribution with  degrees of freedom, mean vector μ (for 1   ) and covariance matrix
(Note 3). It can be represented in the following way:
where
The copula of vector X is the Student's t copula with  degrees of freedom. It can be represented as follows:
In equation ( 
where R 12 is the linear correlation coefficient of the bivariate Student's t distribution with  degrees of freedom, if 2 ν  .
In our study, the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index represents the European banking sector. Our data set is composed by the daily returns of the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index and of every bank in the sample (25 banks Assuming that the copula of X i,t and X s,t is the bivariate Student's t copula, Hakwa et al. (2015) demonstrated that:
Supposing that X i,t and X s,t are EVT distributed as in equation (11), the following equation is obtained with refer to the left tail of the return distribution:
In our empirical study for estimating the other risk measures, MES and CES, we utilize Monte Carlo simulation for obtaining a high number of scenarios for the N standardized log-returns Z i,t for financial institutions. The margins of the standardized log-returns Z i,t for financial institutions are EVT distributed following equation (11).
For modelling the dependence structure we use the multivariate Student's t-copula that is the copula of the multivariate Student's t-distribution. Let X be a vector with an N-variate standardized Student's t-distribution with  degrees of freedom, and covariance matrix R 2 ν ν  (for 2 ν  ) (Note 7). It can be represented in the following way:
where, S is a r.v. distributed as a chi-squared with  degrees of freedom (S ~2 ν χ ) and Y is a random vector The copula of the vector X is the Student's t-copula with  degrees of freedom. It can be analytically represented in the following way: In order to simulate random variates from the Student's t-copula (18), t C R ,  , we can use the following algorithm, which is based on equation (17):  find the Cholesky decomposition, A, of R;  simulate n independent random variates z=(z 1 ,…,z n )
T from the standard normal distribution N(0, 1);
 simulate a random variate, s, from 2 distribution, independent of z;
 determine the vector y = Az;
In this work, in order to obtain a Monte Carlo scenario x for the N financial institutions daily log-returns X, we
using the marginal distributions in equation (11). We first obtain the standardized 
. Then we rescale these standardized log-returns using the square roots of the variances in equation (9): x=(x 1 ,...,x n )
Given 10,000 scenarios for the N financial institutions daily log-returns X, we calculate the financial system return by equation (5) in 3.2. section and MES it and CES it as in equations (7) and (8) respectively in which C is equal to the Value-at-Risk of the random variable X st at the probability level of 1% over a daily holding period.
Empirical Analysis and Data Set
The principal aim of this research is to evaluate the contribution of each bank in the sample to the instability of the whole European banking sector. In order to achieve this purpose, we use publicly available daily returns and employ three different systemic risk metrics (alternatively).
In particular, for each bank in the sample, we calculate daily ΔCoVaR, MES and CES, over a one-day holding period, with refer to the following four different time spans: 1) the mean of daily ΔCoVaRs, MESs and CESs, over the total time horizon for every bank in the sample (see Table 1 );
2) the mean of daily ΔCoVaRs, MESs and CESs on the crisis period (from July 2, 2007 to May 15, 2009) for every bank (see Table 5 ); in this time span, the values of the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index fell considerably (see Figure 2) ; 3) the daily ΔCoVaR, MES and CES (for each of 25 banks in the sample) in the worst day, 30th October 2008, (see Table 9 ), that is when the Banking Index showed its worst daily value (see Figure 2) . Table 13 ). In Tables 1, 5 , 9 and 13 we collect the outcomes in terms of contribution of each institution to European systemic risk by ranking the banks according to the values of MES, CES and ΔCoVaR on the four different time horizons respectively. It is interesting to analyze whether different systemic risk metrics recognize the same institutions as the most riskiness.
In addition, for each bank in the sample, we also report the risk rankings calculated by using the traditional risk Another aim of this research is to attest the possible existence of a strong linkage between systemic risk measures and traditional risk measures.
In Tables 2, 3 and 4 we report the numbers of concordances between pairs of different risk measures for the top 10 financial institutions, for the top 5 institutions and for the top 3 banks respectively, with refer to the total sample time period; in Tables 6, 7 and 8 the numbers of concordances between pairs of risk measures are calculated for the top 10, the top 5 and the top 3 banks on the crisis period; in Tables 10, 11 and 12 we collect the numbers of concordances between pairs of different risk metrics accounted on a particular day, that is the worst day; in Tables 14, 15 and 16 the numbers of concordances refer to the period before the crisis. With refer to the total sample period (see Table 1 ), we find a good coherence of ranking results among the three different systemic risk measures. In fact, CES and ΔCoVaR identify as risky the same six banks among the top 10 most dangerous institutions; also MES and ΔCoVaR detect the same six institutions, while CES and MES recognize the same five institutions as risky.
Considering the numbers of concordances between the two different type of measures (systemic and market) taken in pairs, we note as ΔCoVaR and rho identify the same ten institutions. Moreover MES and beta classify the same seven institutions as risky, while MES and VaR order the same six institutions (see Table 2 ).
When we restrict the analysis to the top 5 most riskiness banks (see Table 3 ), we again find a strong coherence between the rankings calculated by ΔCoVaR and by rho (5 concordances out of 5 banks) and an interesting consistency between the rankings based on MES and on beta (3 concordances out of 5 institutions).
If we limit the observations to the top 3 risky institutions (see Table 4 ), we find in particular that ΔCoVaR confirms the strong linkage with rho.
From this first empirical analysis, we may affirm that the risk information captured by the correlation between each institution and the whole banking system is mostly replicated by ΔCoVaR metric, while the risk information expressed by beta is gathered regularly by MES.
The CES metric appears the systemic risk measure more independent of the traditional market risk metrics of beta, VaR and rho showing a constant linkage with ΔCoVaR metric.
Moreover, we observe that the top 3 risky institutions identified by CES (HSBC, Santander and BNP Paribas) are on average the most capitalized institutions on the whole sample period. Therefore we may affirm that CES emphasizes the role of firm size in the systemic risk ranking.
Differently, MES identifies National Bank of Greece as the first most risky institution perhaps due to its drawback of not taking into account the relative weight of each institution in the banking system. Moreover, we observe as National Bank of Greece shows a high value of VaR (looking at the ranking based on the VaR metric, National Bank of Greece is the third most risky bank).
Comparing the empirical results for CES with the FSB's list of G-SIBs as of November 2015 composed by using end-2014 proprietary data (see Table A ), we find HSBC and BNP Paribas allocated in the most risky buckets (4° and 3° levels respectively), and Santander assigned to 1° bucket (the lowest systemic risk bucket). Note. The G-SIBs are allocated to buckets corresponding to required levels of additional capital buffers according to the greater systemic risk level. The numbers in parentheses are the required level of additional common equity loss absorbency as a percentage of risk-weighted assets that applies to each G-SIB.
When we extend the comparison with the FSB's list to the top 10 institutions identified by CES, we find a very strong coherence between the two rankings (9 concordances out of 10) with the only exception of Bilbao that does not appear on the FSB's list. We highlight that Bilbao is identified like dangerous by CES due to its high relative market capitalization.
Similarly the number of concordances between the rankings of ΔCoVaR and of FSB's list is very good (8 institutions out of 10) with the exception of Intesa San Paolo and Commerzbank which do not appear on the FSB's list. ΔCoVaR identifies Intesa San Paolo and Commerzbank as dangerous institutions due to their high values of correlation with European banking system.
The level of coherence with the FSB's list reduces for MES that identifies National Bank of Greece, Commerzbank, Erste Group Bank and Eurobank Ergasias as SIBs, while these banks do not appear on the FSB's list. Moreover, we note as National Bank of Greece, Commerzbank, Erste Group Bank and Eurobank Ergasias are identified as risky institutions by the VaR metric that quantifies the market tail risk of each bank in isolation.
Otherwise, we know that a bank can appear very risky when viewed alone, but it does not contribute considerably to the instability of the whole financial system mostly considering its low relative weight in the system. This is the case, in particular, for National Bank of Greece, Eurobank Ergasias and Erste Group Bank. Table 7 . Number of concordances between pairs of risk measures for the top 5 financial institutions (crisis period) Table 8 . Number of concordances between pairs of risk measures for the top 3 financial institutions (crisis period)
Observing the results from the risk rankings with refer to the crisis period (from July 2, 2007 to May 15, 2009), we may affirm that the strong linkage between MES and beta is confirmed as well as the positive relationship between ΔCoVaR and correlation (see Table 5 ).
Among the three systemic risk metrics the most number of concordances are found for CES and ΔCoVaR. In addition, we underline as the systemic risk metric of MES again displays a strong positive link with the regulatory risk metric of market VaR (see Tables 5 , 6, 7, 8) .
Always with refer to the crisis period we find for the CES metric a strong concordance with the FSB's list (see Table A ). Looking at the top 10 institutions ranked by CES as systemically dangerous banks, eight institutions are identified as SIBs by FSB too, with the exception of Bilbao (ES) and Intesa SanPaolo (IT). For ΔCoVaR as well as for MES the numbers of concordances with the FSB's list reduce to six institutions.
When we focus the empirical analysis on the worst day (October 30, 2008), we may confirm the strong positive linkage between MES and beta as well as the positive relationship between ΔCoVaR and the correlation between every bank and the system (see Tables 9 , 10, 11, 12) . Table 9 ).
When we restrict the comparison with the FSB's list to the top 5 risky institutions, the CES metric improves its performance identifying five institutions out of five.
Differently MES identifies Commerzbank like SIB, while this bank does not appear on the FSB's list. Also the metric of ΔCoVaR classifies Intesa SanPaolo as SIB differently from FSB.
In order to further confirm the consistency of these results, we have focused the comparative analysis among the different systemic risk measures on the period before the crisis, that is from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 .
The different ranking outcomes in terms of systemic risk calculated by MES, CES and ΔCoVaR and the market risk rankings based on the traditional metrics of rho, beta and VaR are collected in Table 13 for pre-crisis period. Tables 14, 15 and 16), we may confirm the constant strong positive linkage between ΔCoVaR and rho. Differently from the previous analyses, for the pre-crisis period we also find a robust positive relationship between ΔCoVaR and beta.
Comparing the systemic risk rankings based on MES, CES and ΔCoVaR with the list of G-SIBs identified by FSB we find for the top 10 systemically risky banks that CES recognizes as SIBs the same nine banks identified by FSB's list, with the exception of Bilbao. The number of concordances between ΔCoVaR and FSB'list decreases to seven banks out of ten. In fact, ΔCoVaR categorizes Commerzbank (DE), Intesa SanPaolo (IT) and MPS (IT) as systemically risky banks differently from FSB's list because of their high correlation values. The number of concordances between MES and the FSB's list drops to five banks.
When we focus the comparisons on the top 5 risky banks, we find that CES confirms the very high level of concordance with FSB's list (5 banks out of 5); also ΔCoVaR shows with the FSB's list a good number of concordances equal to four banks (except for Lloyd). The number of concordances for MES drops to three banks out of five. MES identifies Erste Group Bank (AT) and Commerzbank (DE) as systemically risky banks differently from FSB.
In conclusion, also for the pre-crisis period the overall results are consistent with those achieved for the crisis period, the worst day and the whole period.
In particular, the systemic metric of CES shows a very high level of consistency with the results derived from the G-SIBs identification model adopted by FSB. The only exception is Bilbao identified like SIB by CES with refer to all four different sample time horizons (Intesa SanPaolo is categorized as SIB by CES only in relation to the crisis period and the worst day).
Additionally, CES is more independent than MES and ΔCoVaR from the traditional risk measures of beta and rho. In other words, the CES metric does not replicate the risk rankings based on the traditional market risk metrics offering to regulatory authorities and to financial investors a -new‖ risk information regarding the financial system fragility.
Conclusion
This work offers for European banking sector an original empirical analysis with refer to three different systemic risk measures: MES, CES and ΔCoVaR.
While MES and ΔCoVaR are two metrics well known and recognized by financial researchers and regulatory authorities, the CES measure is more recent and less famous.
We underline as the main purpose of this research is to select the riskiest financial institutions by directly ranking the banks according to their systemic riskiness based on MES, CES and ΔCoVaR metrics, respectively.
With refer to the above aim, we find a good coherence of ranking results among the three different systemic risk measures. In particular, CES and ΔCoVaR show the greatest level of agreement between them in terms of systemic risk rankings.
With refer to MES, we discover a strong linkage with the traditional market risk measure of beta. We remember as beta quantifies the amount of systematic risk of an institution or, in other words, the risk not eliminable by portfolio diversification. For this reason, we argue that MES helps little to order European banks for their systemic importance.
In fact, this strong positive relationship between MES and beta can generate confusion between the concepts of systemic and systematic risk respectively. The former quantifies the contribution of each financial institution to the tail risk of the whole financial system, while the latter measures the traditional market risk of an institution, that is its sensitivity to market volatility.
Also Benoit et al. (2013) found a strong positive relationship between MES and beta for a sample of top financial US institutions over the period 2000-2010. According to Benoit et al. (2013) , this result denotes that systemic risk ranking of financial institutions based on MES may reflect ranking obtained by ordering institutions on the traditional systematic (or market) risk measure of Sharpe's beta.
Moreover, MES categorizes National Bank of Greece as the first most risky institution on the whole sample time period due to its drawback of not taking into account the relative weight of each institution in the banking system (measured by its relative market capitalization). This drawback of MES has been also underlined in the study of Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2013) for US financial institutions over the period 2002-2007. In addition, our empirical study discovers for ΔCoVaR metric an interesting strong linkage with the correlation between each bank and the banking system. From these results, in our opinion, ΔCoVaR seems to reproduce better the paradigm of the too-interconnected-to-fail.
Moreover, in our study, ΔCoVaR shows also a weak linkage with market VaR, coherently with the findings of other researchers. We remember as previously Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011; 2016) underlined as ΔCoVaR is not equivalent to VaR; in particular, they reported a weak relationship between the market tail risk of an institution measured in isolation by its VaR and the ΔCoVaR of the same institution. Also Benoit et al. (2013) found a weak linkage between the market VaR of each institution and its contribution to systemic risk, measured by its ΔCoVaR. In particular, their empirical studies on US financial sector over the period 2000-2010 confirmed as systemic risk ranking of US financial institutions based on ΔCoVaR does not mirror ranking obtained by ordering institutions on market VaR.
With refer to CES, our empirical outcomes underline as this systemic metric emphasizes the role of firm's size, expressed in terms of its relative market capitalization, in determining its contribution to the distress of the whole financial system. Consequently, CES metric appears in line with the -too-big-to-fail‖ paradigm coherently with the empirical results of Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2013) for US financial institutions over the period 2002-2007. In addition, we discover that CES is more independent than MES and ΔCoVaR from the traditional risk measures of beta and rho. In other words, the CES metric does not replicate the risk rankings based on the traditional market risk metrics offering to regulatory authorities and to financial investors a -new‖ risk information concerning the financial system fragility.
Moreover, we find that CES exhibits an interesting good concordance with ΔCoVaR in ranking the systemic risk contributions of each institution.
In the light of our empirical findings, we argue that CES offers an interesting compromise between the two paradigms of -too-big-to-fail‖ and -too-interconnected-to-fail‖, respectively. Because of all the above considerations, our final conclusion is that CES, a new a very simple metric that measures the absolute contribution of an institution to the risk of the entire financial system (as opposed to the marginal contribution), may be an interesting candidate for regulatory systemic risk metric.
